The two most important military theorists of the nineteenth century were Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini. Both men gained extensive military experience during the Napoleonic and Prussian Wars, but despite both of their significant contributions to military theory and strategy their approaches are often viewed as incompatible by military theorists, teachers, leaders and others. As military theorist Thomas Huber notes, "Jomini's approach to war was in extreme contrast to Clausewitz'" (1). Colonel John Osborne maintains their approaches often "did not coincide," and military historian A.M.J. Hyatt claims "the difference between their theories of war is very great" (1; 177). This analysis will argue that despite different approaches to war, the similarities between the theories of Clausewitz and Jomini are as significant as the differences.
There are a number of significant distinctions in the military theories and approaches to war of Clausewitz and Jomini. Clausewitz focused on the political and strategic levels of warfare, including war as the ultimate tool of political diplomacy. As Clausewitz wrote, "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means" (Osgood 2). In contrast, Jomini's focus was more on the operations of war, extolling war as heroic reinforcing the effectiveness of the Napoleonic model of "massing, attacking, and quickly winning decisive battles" by attacking the enemy at a "decisive point" (Osgood 1-2). Military activity, simply, unfolded through "strategy, grand tactics, and logistics" (Osgood 2). Clausewitz, in contrast, focused on the permanent elements of war and how they functioned.
Another significant difference between the two theorists is that Clausewitz believed war was chaotic and filled with what he called "friction," the imponderables and unknowable elements that Jomini tried to define as the elements of conflict in a more cook-book like for...