ion (Glenny, 1992, p. 31). When he came to power, his main ambition had been to rewrite the federal constitution to establish Serbian dominance and then rule a united Yugoslavia through the existing communist structures. He was and is, however, universally loathed in every Yugoslavian state except Montenegro and Serbia. Even among the Serbs in Bosnia, he was viewed as one in whom one should not invest any real hope (Glenny, 1992, p. 33).
In October 1989, Slovenia responded to MilosevicÆs rise to power by drafting a new Slovenian constitution and explicitly declaring its right to secede. Croatia soon proposed its own plans for secession. Although these proposals would not become official until June 1991, Yugoslavia was beginning to disintegrate.
On June 28, 1989, a gathering of thousands of Serbs met outside of the Kosovor capital, Pristina, to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the historic battle of Kosovo. Milosevic addressed the crowd. As is usually the case with patriotic celebrations, the speech glorified the virtues of the homeland, creating a feeling of pride among the celebrants. But his address had a dark twist to it: ôAfter six centuries, we are again engaged in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, but this cannot be excluded yet. Nobody must ever again dare to beat this peopleö (Malcolm, 1992, p. 213). The Serbian response to his address was overwhelming and convinced Milosevic that the most powerful tool that could be used to consolidate his power lay in the fomentation of Serbian nationalism. Milosevic became a master at stirring up hatred and violence against non-Serbs, even in those areas where there had been little or no recent history of ethnic tension (Wermouth, 1996, p. 80).
Milosevic began to use and encourage the use of anti-Croatian rhetoric. He and the media routinely referred to the Croatians in general and Ivica Racan, leader of the Croatian Communists, in particular, a...