llowed. Thus, animals should not be made to suffer because it is morally wrong to make fellow human beings suffer.
Research animals probably experience more suffering than human beings (7). Bernard Rollin cites ethical research on pain: "Understanding the cause of an unpleasant sensation diminishes its severity . . . by the same token, not understanding its cause can increase its severity" (7:60). Animals cannot fathom the cause of their pain, nor do they have knowledge of when cessation is likely to occur. Further, all living beings equate pain with danger or injury and respond with a desire to escape. It is logical to assume that research animals, restrained in their ability to escape, experience significant emotional distress as well as physical suffering during experimentation. The Association of Veterinary Teachers and Research Workers classifies the suffering of laboratory animals on a scale of increasing severity that ranges from physiological stress (e.g., raised heartbeat), to overstress (diversion of resources to adapt to the stressor), to distress (6:171).
Animal rights gained prominence as a movement in the United States during the 1970s. Authors such as Roslind Godlovitch et al., Richard Ryder, and Peter Singer raised the consciousness of the public regarding the status of animals as victims. Animal exploitation was seen as a form of prejudice as reprehensible as fascism, racism, or sexism.
According to Richard Watson, four standard arguments form the basis of the current debate regarding the rights of animals. These arguments are the ecological, the prudential, the sentimental, and the contractual. The ecological argument states that "the land" (e.g., animal, mineral, vegetable) has an inherent right to exist. The land makes possible the existence and survival of human beings, and through this function the land earns its moral rights. The prudential argument contends that, if humans treat animals a...