st service" is separate from the previous discussion of "intent," as I agree with Justice Stevens' dissent in McNally to the extent that he believes the effect of the Court's holding there makes both the "intent to defraud" element and the "for obtaining money or property by . . . fraudulent means . . . ." element necessary for a finding of mail fraud. Prior to McNally, the record seems to indicate that proof of either element was sufficient for a finding of mail fraud. Since then, however, both elements appear to be necessary. In any event, since we would be unable to prove intent and since there are no facts to show that Garzoni received money or property from the K-Mart, an allegation of mail fraud fails regardless of whether you believe either or both elements are required. As such, the analysis of the following "honest service" provision is the relevant discussion.)
The "intangible right of honest service" provision
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