oint the Pintos built during that period [1970-1975 or prior to the adoption to the more rigorous NHTSA Standard 301] appear to have met the existing regulatory standards for fuel safety." ("The Ethics of Automobile Regulation," at 290 in (Birsch & Fielder, supra)).
It is also true that Ford opposed the adoption of Standard 301. It learned very soon (in October 1970), according to Birsch, from further crash tests that "the car was potentially unsafe following relatively low-speed, rear-end collisions." (Douglas Birsch, "Introduction: The Pinto Controversy," at 11 (in Birsch & Fielder, supra)). By 1973, many Ford managers knew that a relatively low cost fix could have been initiated but delayed recalling the Pinto until forced to do by a combination of law suit losses and mounting adverse publicity. It also is clear the decision not to recall the Pinto nor to retrofit it with a safer fuel tank was made at a fairly senior management level, not by engineers.
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