e sorely tested in the war to come.
Singapore was centrally located at the crossroads of British Empire trade routes in the 19th century. During that time, Singapore prospered as a port providing work for Chinese, Indians Australians and British. As a Crown colony, Singapore's decidedly undemocratic government maintained a modest role in imperial defense (McIntyre 9).
Following World War One, the only rival navies were allies, the United States and Japan. Without a base east of Malta, Britain found itself in the awkward position of matching the naval strength of its two major partners. For this reason, British focus shifted to Singapore and the distant Pacific Ocean (McIntyre 19-21).
First proposed in 1919, initial plans called for construction of a naval base in preparation for hypothetical wars with the U.S. at Pearl Harbor and the Japanese home bases (McIntyre 2). Singapore was chosen since, although the area was too far for an easy attack on or by Japan, it could protect both the critical Australian and Indian trade routes (McIntyre 6-7). As a major part of the British Commonwealth Deterrent Defense, the Singapore Naval Base would be built to service the British Main Fleet.
Vacillating and ineffective bureaucratic British policies under Chamberlain and Churchill abounded between the Wars. Requiring 20 years to complete, the construction on the Base was delayed because the government had trouble bank-rolling the project. Budget cuts and work slow downs were de rigueur (McIntyre 57). Meanwhile, British Chiefs of Staff, caught in the crosscurrents of changing technology and naval disarmament, debated for a decade the merits of artillery or aircraft defenses (McIntyre 85).
Although the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) considered Singapore to be the most vulnerable of all potential sites, both Chamberlain and Churchill held a common belief that prospects for war in the Far East were remote, since Japan...