on was based on faulty assumptions and was designed to deal with a situation that no longer existed. Western intelligence services showed a systematic failure in forecasting the demise of the Soviet Union; and it is these same intelligence services that had formulated standing American foreign relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union.
The White House's lack of preparedness for the changes in the region and in Russia in particular was made all the worse by its apparent lack of interest. Although arms control was a heavy priority, it apparently was seen by the Bush Administration as sufficient attention to Russia. When Gorbachev first introduced the 500-Days Reform Plan to usher in a fundamental transition of the Soviet and Russian economy, Bush applauded the effort and implied that the West would provide massive economic aid. The Reform Plan boldly declared: "Humanity has not yet developed anything more efficient than the market economy. . . . Revenue from property must be recognized as lawful profit" (The Economist, 1990, p. 3).
But the West did not carry through on its pledge to help the Soviet economic transition. Bush appointed Robert Strauss as U.S. ambassador to Moscow, which could have been a constructive effort since Strauss was known as being a pragmatist in foreign policy. Strauss's appointment signaled to Russia that the United States recognized that the Cold War was over and that the U.S. was ready to do business in reconstructing the former Soviet states. However, Strauss was unable to galvanize the U.S. administration into keeping its
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