This research provides a working definition of monad, with reference to Leibniz's text, and discusses how Leibniz develops his argument for monads as fundamental metaphysical concepts. This analysis of monads explores strengths and weaknesses of the argument, based on whether the philosophical premises are true, sound, or coherent. As appropriate, possible objections to and evaluations of Leibniz's metaphysical construct are suggested.
Whether Leibniz's philosophical premises are true cannot be answered with surety either affirmatively or negatively. Competing philosophical systems could question the validity of monadology and demonstrate their own validity in a way that could point up deficiencies in Leibniz's approach. But this does not mean that Leibniz's scheme of thought is incapable of establishing a structure for considering fundamental metaphysical questions of truth, knowledge, understanding, or even ethics or aesthetics. What does seem clear is that Leibniz intends his concept of monads to account for difficulties with various metaphysical conceptions of reality. But it is legitimate to scrutinize and test Leibniz's own theories.
Leibniz's approach has strong internal logic. One purpose of his argument is to demonstrate the preeminence of logic, concerned with mental activity, as a fundamental principle. Leibniz believes that all knowledge and perception lie implicit in the mind, even while it is unconscious; in a faint or in dreamless sleep, "it does not at all follow that in such a state the simple substance is without any perception" (633).
Awareness of subconscious mental processes positions Leibniz as something of a metaphysical precursor of Freud, but Leibniz's emphasis is on the glory and wonder of human reason, not its pathology. According to Leibniz mere experience does not create knowledge, even though it may clarify and heighten it. While it may be the case that nothing can exist in the intellect that w...