This paper will discuss the events of November 21, 1920, in Dublin, Ireland, popularly known as "Bloody Sunday." The first part of the paper will describe what happened on that day: the assassination of British officers by the Irish Republican Army and the reprisal of the Black and Tans that afternoon. The second part of the paper will examine the political background to the events and the general political goals of the IRA in carrying out the attacks. The third part of the paper will discuss the strategic implications of the attack, including whether the attack accomplished both its tactical and strategic goals.
On November 17, 1920, Dick McKee, a commandant of the Dublin Brigade of the Volunteers (or Irish Republican Army), and his second-in-command, Peadar Clancy, were ordered by Michael Collins to prepare an operation which would eliminate a group of British Army officers who were said to be part of a secret service unit carrying out an effective counterinsurgency campaign against the IRA in Dublin. Collins was probably the most powerful member of the IRA at that time and had established a very effective intelligence network in Dublin. The attack was to be carried out on Sunday morning, November 21. McKee and Clancy, however, were captured by police the night before the operation and Collins was unable to determine whether they had been forced to talk. Taking a chance, he issued orders early on the morning of the 21st to carefully selected members of the Dublin Brigade to carry out the planned operation.
At exactly 9:00 A.M., groups of IRA gunmen paid visits to hotel and boarding house rooms throughout Dublin. At 38 Upper Mount Street, Lieutenants Aimes and Bennett of the Royal Army were pulled out of their beds, stood next to each other, and shot. At 92 Baggott Street, Captain Newbury heard a commotion, got out of bed to lock the door to his room, and began climbing out the window. Armed men broke open the door...