. Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiment discusses his view of the development of moral sentiments and of the impartial spectator. Smith analyzes the issues in terms of a moral psychology based on sympathy, and he defines sympathy as a form of compassion, "the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner" (Smith 9). Sympathetic feelings may develop from our seeing emotion in another person, but for Smith feelings of sympathy are best aroused when we know the reason for the emotion. It is our view of the situation which produces the sympathy which links us all to some central attitudes and ideas. we are all participants as impartial spectators, with the idea of the impartial spectator being a personification of our conscience and so of our attitudes toward events and behaviors. We base our judgments on sympathy. When the passion of the principal person are such that they are in accord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, then the spectator sees these passions as just and proper. This arouses a sense of the propriety of the expressed emotion. We judge ourselves in the same way by considering in effect how we are viewed by the impartial spectator, and we can achieve this by looking at our own behavior as if it were being performed by someone else.
Because of his emphasis on sympathy, Smith develops a moral view that is clearly social in nature, involving as it does the interplay of individuals with the observers surrounding him or her. Our sense of propriety is the central question in our moral judgments, and we judge the suitableness or unsuitableness of actions on this basis. He brings in the idea of utility as something that may commend certain qualities to us, but our view of those qualities is first developed on the basis of sympathy and not on the basis of utility.
Hume considers the nature of and origin of morality and asks ...